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Abstract
In this paper, we discuss what Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus can add to 
psychologically informed debates around social class. We argue that habitus 
offers a way of coming to terms with the complexity and different dimensions of 
social class. For Bourdieu, habitus conceptualises the internalisation of social 
structures, how the “outer” becomes the “inner”. This distinct psychological 
question is critical for Bourdieu’s “psychoanalysis of the social”. We argue that 
Bourdieu’s habitus ties in with psychologically informed views on classed 
existence, but can also function as a tool to further psychological studies by 
suggesting a broader focus and pointing to aspects that tend to be 
underrepresented in mainstream psychological research, and that are also 
difficult to dissect from a psychological vantage point. In particular, questions of 
structural (power) inequalities and their reproduction on a communal as well as 
on an individual level are at the core of Bourdieu’s habitus concept, but these are 
often absent from contemporary class analysis. Finally, we argue that for all its 
complexity, the habitus concept can inform research on a practical level by 
enabling exploration of the complexity and messiness of the classed nature of 
everyday experience. 
Bourdieu, Social Class, Habitus, Inequality
Introduction
Pierre Bourdieu’s work will be familiar to most within the social sciences, in the 
English-speaking world at least.  However, it appears that his social theory is 
only partly received within much mainstream social research. For example, 
whereas his theory of forms of social capital has made an impact in sociological, 
psychological and educational research, his concept of habitus can, at times, be 
given less attention within such disciplines. As we will argue in the following, this 
is regrettable for a number of reasons as the habitus concept is of central 
importance in Bourdieu's oeuvre and is necessary to understand concepts like 
the aforementioned forms of social capital.
     There are a number of contributions that aim to further the psychological 
foundation of the habitus concept and apply it to issues of interest to 
psychological research. Lizardo (2009) for instance analyses internalisation as a 
process of learning with regards to the related neuropsychological processes, 
and elsewhere argues that the cognitive origins of habitus are at times 
overlooked (Lizardo, 2004).  These are valuable contributions insofar as they 
counter the tendency to equate internalisations with socialisation. In this paper 
we will argue that Bourdieu’s understanding of the formation of habitus is neither 
reducible to individual cognitive processes nor can it be assumed to be a purely 
collective process: to put it simply, internalisation in a Bourdieusian sense is how 
the individual translates their material living conditions into cognitive and 
unconscious structures – how the social becomes embodied. As Stam (2009, p. 
708) shows, psychological research has applied the habitus concept in a 
multitude of ways (“from the ‘habitus of hygiene’, the ’erotic habitus’, the 
‘military habitus’ to the ‘dot-com habitus’”) and not all of those can necessarily 
be seen as following Bourdieu’s original concept in terms of intention, meaning 
and scope. A shortened and superficial interpretation of Bourdieu’s work is at risk 
of producing ahistorical and detached descriptions of the social world or of 
individual characteristics that ignore and negate Bourdieu’s political claims. It is, 
however, equally problematic to use Bourdieu’s theory of forms of capital without 
locating it in his wider theory and without relating forms of capital to the habitus. 
Below, we first outline our main concerns on a general, theoretical level and then 
relate them to a couple of empirical examples, specifically the concepts of 
empowerment and work stress, which we will argue illustrate the way much of 
contemporary psychology and related disciplines help frame the habitus in such 
a way that (classed) power relations are to a great extent unconsidered. 
      Forms of capital cannot be understood in a meaningful way if not seen in 
connection to specific fields of the social world. This is probably most obvious 
with regards to social capital that cannot be dissociated from actual connections 
and interactions in a specific field. However, other forms of capital like cultural 
capital cannot be regarded as of essential usefulness and worth, they only gain 
value if legitimised and therefore validated in related social fields. The 
relationship between field and capital is a reciprocal one and therefore it is not 
only the respective fields that validate capital; forms of legitimate capital also 
structure social fields. Bourdieu’s theory of forms of capital proved particularly 
popular in educational research (Dumais, 2002). If applying Bourdieu’s forms of 
capital to educational contexts, we would argue that it is vital to remember that 
educational institutions not only validate certain kinds of knowledge and skills, 
but are themselves shaped by the force of already legitimised social and cultural 
capital. 
     Bourdieu’s model offers an approach that combines different dimensions of 
social classification and allows us to analyse their interrelatedness. Therefore the 
habitus concept is an essential addition to the theory of forms of capitals as it 
locates these differences historically, politically and in direct relation to the 
reproduction of power. Furthermore, the habitus concept is very valuable in 
exploring the interconnectedness of structural relationships and individual 
characteristics. Of course, Bourdieu’s forms of capital cannot be reduced to 
individual traits, but in the habitus concept this link is developed with regards to 
the effects of such traits on individual and collective consciousness. The habitus 
concept furthers and deepens the understanding of the reproductions of social 
inequalities and is therefore of particular relevance to the aforementioned 
educational research. In the following we demonstrate that this is equally true for 
research areas that are traditionally located in the psychological field.
      The habitus concept is of particular interest to such disciplines as sociology, 
education, social work and psychology as it attempts to bridge the division of 
labour between the disciplines, a division that has not always proven helpful in 
the past (Bourdieu & Wacquant,  1992). It offers a methodology to discuss the 
interplay between individual, collective and structural aspects of class divisions 
and is therefore, as a research tool intrinsically political. Using the concept of 
habitus as a basis for analysing the social world puts structural power relations 
and their reproduction into focus and problematizes them on a fundamental 
level. i 
      Habitus is a concept that is often overlooked perhaps due to its perceived 
vagueness and complexity. Putting it into practice is challenging insofar as it 
necessarily involves a rather broad perspective that aims to grasp the multi-
dimensionality of social (power) structures that are rather elusive and 
problematic to express empirically. Things are further complicated by the fact 
that habitus is a way of analysis, and hence a method, as well as a descriptive 
term that depicts class-specific internalisations and their effects both on an 
individual and collective level.  We aim to offer a way of disentangling these 
complexities and making the habitus both conceptually and practically useful, 
and also demonstrate how the habitus concept can be particularly beneficial as 
an underpinning of psychological explorations of social class.
     We argue that Bourdieu’s habitus ties in with psychologically informed views 
on classed existence, but can also function as a tool to further psychological 
studies by suggesting a broader focus and pointing to aspects that tend to be 
underrepresented in mainstream psychological research and that are difficult to 
dissect from a psychological vantage point. In particular, questions of structural 
(power) inequalities and their reproduction on a communal as well as on an 
individual level are at the core of Bourdieu’s habitus concept, but these are often 
absent from contemporary class analysis. The concept of habitus aims to explore 
the dynamic and reciprocal relationship of individuals, social classes and the 
hierarchically structured social as a whole. Finally, for all its complexity, we argue 
that the habitus concept can inform research on a practical level by enabling 
exploration of the complexity and messiness of the classed nature of everyday 
experience. 
Social Space and Social Class
Before we explore the habitus concept and its foundation in, and links with, 
psychological theory, we briefly want to introduce Bourdieu's understanding of 
social class. We believe this is necessary as a conceptual foundation and also to 
set the scene with regards to Bourdieu's characteristic interpretation of the 
relationship of the individual and the social as well as his conception of conscious 
and unconscious dimensions of social class.
     Bourdieu’s understanding of social class is clearly based on Marxist and 
Weberian ideas and also on a critical examination of Althusser’s (1971) 
structuralism. In the following, we try to demonstrate how Bourdieu’s concept of 
social class links two central dimensions of class analysis: economic structures 
and social manifestations of inequality. We will argue that a Bourdieusian class 
analysis offers insights into the subtleties, complexities and unconscious 
psychological aspects of social class without turning its back on the material 
basis of inequality. 
     Bourdieu regards the social world as a multi-dimensional and structured 
space. He “breaks with Marxist theory” (Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991, p. 239) to 
emphasise relations over structure. This means that for Bourdieu the focus is 
much more on the relations within a social space than on the concrete specifics 
of social groupings. Whether this constitutes an actual “break” with Marxism is 
debateable, as Marx (1994) also recognised the interconnectedness and 
hierarchical structure of classes in capitalist societies. A different disagreement 
with Marxism is evident; Bourdieu’s emphasis on symbolic struggles over 
economic strugglesii. Bourdieu speaks of “objectivism” and “intellectualism” that, 
together with a narrow focus on economics “leads one to overlook the symbolic 
struggles that take place in different fields” (Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991, p. 
239). 
     In this respect, Bourdieu’s concept of social space to some extent contradicts 
the traditional Marxist notion of classes as historically formed entities with 
specific roles and inherently antagonistic interests. For Bourdieu, the social space 
consists of a multitude of invisible relationships. Each position in this space is 
defined by its relative location and distance to other positions. This assumption 
to some degree implies a rather individualistic view of society as a 
conglomeration of atomised individuals in a hierarchical order. Bourdieu 
expresses this view explicitly: “From a scientific standpoint, what exists is not 
'social classes' … but rather a social space” (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 3). Nevertheless, 
Bourdieu acknowledges that similar positions in social space and the experience 
of similar living conditions and relative power(lessness) can bring people closer 
together and can lead to a potentially strong and potent group identity. The 
commonality of experience happens intrinsically (in terms of material conditions) 
and relationally (in terms of relative position to other members of society) 
(Bourdieu, 1987). Classes are, for Bourdieu, analytical constructs, “but constructs 
well-founded in reality” (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 5). 
     Classes therefore exist in Bourdieu’s view not as actual groups; “What exists 
is a space of relations” (Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991, p. 232) with varying 
proximity of the individuals inhabiting that space. Accordingly, classes can be 
constructed along different lines of demarcation. These theoretical classes are 
however not necessarily real classes. For Bourdieu, the defining aspect is what 
Marxists would call “class consciousness” and what Bourdieu describes as 
follows: “groups made of individuals united by the consciousness and the 
knowledge of their commonality of condition and ready to mobilise in pursuit of 
their common interest” (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 7). So structure alone does not make 
classes, they are always the result of a historical process that translates 
economic conditions and shared experience into a shared, class- or group-
specific perception of the social structure. Bourdieu speaks of a theoretical class 
as a “class on paper” (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 7) that transforms into a real class by 
the political process of “classmaking” (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 8). The parallels to the 
Marxist distinction between “class in itself” and “class for itself” (Marx, 1963, p. 
173) are rather obvious, and also, in Bourdieu’s concept classes are not 
constructed in a random fashion, but are “collectives having an economic and 
social base” (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 9). 
     To be clear, Bourdieu does not perceive social classes as material entities, but 
uses the term as a theoretical construct that can legitimately claim to describe 
large groups of people who share similar positions in social space and 
accordingly similar living conditions, potentially resulting in a shared 
understanding of the group’s position and interests. Bourdieu and Marx appear to 
reach similar conclusions with regards to the shape of classes, but substantiate 
their claims rather differently. On a superficial level, Bourdieu agrees with the 
classic Marxist view that classes are interrelated and hierarchically structured. 
The nature of this relationship is however not necessarily based on their 
respective positions in the production process. If it is, it is in a rather indirect way. 
The same can be said about domination and exploitation; their existence is not 
disputed, but is not interpreted in a predominantly economic way. Bourdieu is 
less interested in the economic structures that define classes, but more in their 
political, cultural and psychological foundations and in the ways class 
inequalities are practically experienced and reproduced as well as challenged 
and resisted. This nexus, as well as the process of class-making and the 
individual and collective repercussions of (class) inequalities, are theorised in 
Bourdieu's habitus concept.
The Habitus Conceptiii
For Bourdieu, societal structures are partly upheld and reinforced through 
processes that can best be understood with reference to psychological concepts, 
or more precisely with the utilisation of the idea of an individual and collective 
unconscious. Bourdieu uses the term habitus to describe the unconscious 
aspects or, more specifically, the internalisation of societal structures. The 
habitus reflects the position of an individual or group in the class structure and at 
the same time refers to collective and individual practice that is shaped by the 
individual’s or group’s position in social space. Habitus therefore embodies the 
“indirect causal link between position in social space and practices” (Weininger, 
2005, p. 90). It therefore not only refers to attitudes, beliefs and concepts of self 
and the world, but also to individual and collective action and for Bourdieu these 
two spheres are closely linked.
      Bourdieu intends to explain how the “outer” becomes the “inner” and speaks 
of the “incorporation of the objective structures of the social space” (Bourdieu & 
Thompson, 1991, p. 235). This happens largely on an unconscious level as social 
structures are usually not consciously analysed or verbally expressed by the 
individual. Bourdieu here refers to Goffman’s  (1951, p. 297) idea of the “sense 
of one’s place” and the “practical mastery of the social structure” (Bourdieu and 
Thompson, 1991, p.235).
 
     This “mastery” is acquired not predominantly through active reflexion or 
explicit tuition, but through experience. The individual experiences him/herself in 
social structures and power relations and derives their sense of place from this. 
The perception of the social world and the production of meaning are therefore 
structured; how the social world is perceived “beyond the directly visible 
attribute” (ibid.) is greatly influenced by one’s position in the social space which 
is in turn informed by past (symbolic) struggles and characterised by a certain 
vagueness. The need to understand the historicity of both field and habitus is 
something we illustrate with contemporary examples in the section below.
     The link between position and disposition is crucial in this context. Bourdieu 
does not suggest that a given position in social space concretely determines an 
individual’s habitus, rather that the position in relationships of power relate to 
specific dispositions with regards to the habitus (Crossley, 2008). Positions (of 
power) tend to be closely related to more general life conditions and therefore 
Bourdieu see a strong link between position (in social space) and disposition (of 
the habitus). 
The habitus also informs individual and collective practice and serves Bourdieu 
as a concept of practice that neither relies solely on objectivism (that 
understands action as mere reaction to circumstances), nor on subjectivism (that 
emphasises unmediated conscious intention) (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). As 
mentioned, Bourdieu is rather reluctant to speak of social groupings as classes 
and therefore it is questionable whether it is advisable to speak of a “class 
habitus” in a Bourdieusian sense. Nevertheless, habitus is a collective as much 
as an individual concept. When the habitus becomes objectified as lifestyle, 
there are clearly collective processes at play (Moore, 2008). The social aspects of 
the concept become apparent when lifestyles get categorised in a hierarchical 
order. This order reflects their origin in the social space as well as their proximity 
to the legitimate culture.  Bourdieu's understanding of social theory is a rather 
pragmatic and practical one. Habitus, for him, describes not only intellectual 
aspects of classed existence, but also its practical manifestations. Theory is, for 
Bourdieu, a tool to come to terms with them. In the following, we briefly discuss 
a number of studies that attempt to apply the habitus concept to the 
contemporary social world.
     Processes of internalisation are central to psychological research. Vygotsky 
(1987, p. 57) goes as far as stating that “internalisation of socially rooted and 
historically developed activities is the distinguishing feature of human 
psychology”. If applied to social class, we would argue, there is a need to 
psychologically explore how the “sense of one’s place” establishes itself and 
more specifically, how inequalities and political power are perceived and 
ultimately internalised. In the following we want to briefly portray research that 
aims to apply the dualism that makes the habitus concept a complex, yet 
valuable research tool. 
Habitus Inspired Research
Research informed by Bourdieu's habitus concept confirms that class is a 
relevant category that people use to make sense of the world (e.g. Savage, 
2001; Skeggs, 1997; Reay, 1998). However, these authors also found reluctance 
by some to identify themselves in class terms. Class is a very ambivalent, 
emotionally charged concept that is, in a wider sense, political, as well as loaded 
with meaning and normativity (Savage, 2001). Despite being rejected as a 
category and despite the difficulty to verbally define and express its essence, 
class is lived. Reay (1998) insists that the concept of class is used by people to 
locate themselves and others,  and emphasises that class is not only a social, 
political and ultimately theoretical concept, class is “done”, it is performed on a 
daily basis and influences attitudes and practice. 
     More recent research conducted in a contemporary UK context by Haylett 
(2003), Lawler (2004), Tyler (2008) and Walkerdine et al. (2001) analyses how 
habitus shapes subjectivity, but the aforementioned authors do so without 
neglecting the social anchoring of the concept. Haylett (2003) for instance 
describes the dialectical nature of habitus as produced by divisions of society 
whilst simultaneously reproducing those divisions. Class is, for her, as it is for 
Bourdieu, a “matter of embodied social practice” (Haylett, 2003, p. 62). Social 
inequalities are reflected in individuals and as Walkerdine et al. (2001) point out , 
this happens on a multitude of levels. Difference is produced and (generally 
involuntarily) displayed through accents, style, housing etc. and, importantly, 
people are often acutely aware of the hierarchy of these micro-distinctions. 
Walkerdine et al. (2001) make the point that as much as class is naturally a 
collective concept, in the understanding of their participants, (class related) 
classifications were made based on the characteristics of the individual person. 
Accordingly, it was the individual that was being rated and judged. And, as Tyler 
(2008) adds, this judgement is often emotionally mediated. Class distinctions 
become displaced and individualised on to the individual person who is 
“approved or disapproved, normalized or pathologized” (Lawler, 2004, p. 110). 
Through this process, the central social inequalities are realised in the individual; 
objective inequalities between large groups are translated into differences in 
individual behaviour and attitudes. As Reay (2005) demonstrates, internalised 
hierarchies have a strong emotional dimension in the sense that they are 
perceived as (potentially damaging) personal judgments that regulate normality. 
Value judgements tend to be morally loaded and therefore likely to inflict shame 
(Sayer 2005). Again, these judgements relate to the hierarchical class structure 
of a society, but tend to be made on an individual level.
     Looking at class from a Bourdieusian perspective clearly suggests a rather 
broad interpretation of the concept. Class forms identity way beyond conscious 
affiliations and political attitudes. Therefore, we prefer the term “class habitus” 
to the term “class identity” as the former points to a more comprehensive 
understanding of class. Habitus includes very relevant unconscious elements of 
classed being, and also examines the dialectical relation between the material 
reality and (unconsciously formed) attitudes. Bourdieu illustrates this nexus with 
the example of perceived limits and confined expectations. Through the process 
of internalisation “social divisions become principles of division” (Bourdieu, 1984, 
p. 471). The perception of the social world is structured by a mental structure 
that is itself greatly influenced by the (power) structure of the social world. 
Therefore, social realities, like the unequal distribution of power for example, 
appear natural or self-evident. In the context of the chosen example this means 
that the dominated social actor perceives her role as justified, or as Bourdieu 
puts it, the “embodiment of the objective laws” results in individuals “adjusting 
their expectations to their chances, defining themselves as the objective order 
defines them” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 471). 
     This nexus can probably be most clearly analysed in educational contexts 
where it is not only the differences in cultural capital that influence outcomes, 
but also differences with regards to habitus. ‘Educational aspiration’ is however a 
very limited and ultimately not useful operationalization of educational habitus. 
In a Bourdieusian sense, the class-related differences in educational achievement 
mirror the social hierarchy for a number of reasons.  The aforementioned ‘sense 
of one’s place’ comes into play again. Whereas children of middle- and upper-
class  parents are equipped with a sense of entitlement and an expectation of 
educational success, their working-class peers would need to break with 
(internalised) collective expectations in order to match their aspirations (Nash, 
2003). Reay (2005, p. 921), pointing to the affective aspects  of upward mobility, 
speaks of “the emotional cost of becoming different”. Bourdieu is however keen 
to point out that differences in the educational habitus are not solely a matter of 
attitude, values and emotional distress (and therefore open to psychological 
intervention or treatment), but to some degree a rational choice that reflects 
limited educational opportunities and takes the potentially limited benefits of 
higher education for working-class students into account. So again, Bourdieu 
sees the reproduction of inequality as an interplay of social structure, (collective) 
agency, and, crucially, the internalisation of inequality that makes social 
disparities appear natural. 
     This reasoning appears very much confirmed by the pieces of research 
alluded to above. “Knowing one’s place” (within a hierarchical structure) is a 
theme that shows in most of the aforementioned studiesiv. Thinking “habitus” 
instead of “identity” brings into focus processes of domination and in particular 
their invisibility. However, it is important to note that “knowing one’s place” and 
accepting the status quo as natural is not a pre-given, as the history of class 
conflict during the twentieth century will testify. Nevertheless, we wish to make 
the case that in the current epoch of shrinking social space and a marked decline 
of class consciousness, in the Western world at least, habitus itself has been 
transformed.v
     As abstract and overly complex as it might appear, habitus is a concept that 
research can successfully fill with life. After all, social class is a lived concept. 
Using the concept of habitus can help to appreciate these complexities and grasp 
the (inseparable) individual and social dimensions of class. In order to bring such 
abstract concepts alive, in the next section we briefly detail some contemporary 
socio-political factors and how they can affect the habitus, or in other words, how 
the outside gets inside.
Habitus in a Shrinking Social Spacevi
     As noted above, perception of the social world is structured by a mental 
structure that is itself greatly influenced by the (power) structure of the social 
world, and this process can lead to an acceptance of limits and confine 
expectations. Often, such a process is disguised under apparently benign or 
progressive policies. For example, much has been written about the disciplinary 
nature of professions such as psychiatry, psychology and social work to label, 
categorise and control those seen as deviant from the norm. However, such a 
process not only creates an object, such as the “schizophrenic”, it can also 
create a subject who thinks, feels and acts in the “appropriate” way for a 
“mental patient” (e.g. Foucault, 1967; Scheff, 1984; Rose, 1999).vii 
     The impact of relations of power can be subtle and are arguably more readily 
acceptable as a result. For example, the concept of “empowerment” is frequently 
cited as the goal of social policy and related social and psychological 
interventions. One government publication by the UK New Labour government in 
2009, which contained a foreword by the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown and 
an introduction by then Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government Hazel Blears, mentioned empowerment thirty-six times (CLG, 2008), 
whilst the current UK Prime Minister David Cameron has represented 
empowering people as being ‘a natural part of a Conservative approach to 
government’ (Conservatives, 2009, online).
     Empowerment is a term that is utilised both by the political left and the 
political right, although the intent behind the term is different. For the Left 
empowerment is represented as a cornerstone of political resistance, for the 
Right it refers to economic and entrepreneurial actors. Nevertheless both 
perspectives share the same political strategy which is a desire "to act upon 
others by getting them to act in their own interest" (Cruikshank, 1999, p.68). 
     However, despite its current ubiquity the actual term ‘empowerment’ is a 
relatively recent addition to contemporary social policy discourse. For example, 
in Lukes’ (1974) classic discussion of power the term empowerment does not
appear in the index. It was 1986 before the term appeared in a peer-reviewed 
original article in either Critical Social Policy (Beuret and Stoker, 1986) or the 
British Journal of Social Work (Ryan, 1986). This is interesting given our 
contention, detailed below, that it was the mid-1980s that saw the demise of the 
working class as a political force capable of exercising its collective power.  This 
mainstream academic and political adoption of empowerment differed from its 
more radical usage within past social movements where the term tended to refer 
to the need to challenge the dominant political (and personal) structures that 
were held responsible for oppressive social relations - for example see Collins 
(1991) in relation to empowerment and Black feminism and Kankowski (1997) in 
relation to Deaf empowerment. As it moved to the mainstream there was more of 
a focus on individual, personal empowerment that required the guidance of a 
professional such as a therapist, counsellor or advisor.
     Adams (2008) argues that empowerment can be seen as ‘the capacity of 
individuals, groups and/or communities to take control of their circumstances, 
exercise power and achieve their own goals, and the processes by which, 
individually and collectively, they are able to help themselves and others to 
maximize the quality of their lives’ (p.17). In this respect ‘empowerment’ can be 
seen as a relatively benign term, a way of helping people gain increased power 
to organise their affairs and achieve their goals and desires. 
     However, there is often a failure to acknowledge the way the powerful can 
influence the wants, desires and values of the powerless. In this respect, the 
contemporary notion of empowerment as a process that allows people to have 
more control over their lives can prove illusory. In reality, it can operate as a 
mechanism for drawing people into participating in processes and decisions over 
which they have little control. As Langan (2002) notes,
Parents are said to be empowered by being invited to attend child 
protection case conferences; they thus become complicit in measures of 
state intervention in their family life decided on by professionals and the 
police. Applicants for community care are empowered by the fact that 
their designated social worker is also the manager of a devolved budget 
which is limited by criteria quite independent of the applicant’s needs. Too 
often, empowerment means reconciling people to being powerless. 
(p.215)
      In other words, the power that is given is bound within certain parameters, 
and these can lead to a lowering of expectations as well as being predicated on 
the client ultimately being submissive to those who, in reality, wield power. In a 
Bourdieusian sense this is reflected in a habitus that internalises experienced 
powerlessness and that inclines the agent “to  make a virtue of necessity, that is, 
to refuse what is anyway refused” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 77).
So, whilst the concept of empowerment ostensibly seeks to challenge the sense 
of “knowing one’s place”, in effect it can merely reproduce the parameters of 
place and the scope of action within a changed, but still limited habitus.
      The rise to prominence of the rhetoric of empowerment did not go unnoticed 
or uncontested. Indeed the term had its critics even as it was first becoming 
established. By the early 1990s some had noticed how the term had become 
something of a buzz-word that littered the mission statements of health, welfare 
and education services (Gomm, 1993). Humphries (1996) noted how its mention 
directly or by implication had become ‘de rigueur in articles, books and political 
statements’ and that it had ‘become a key objective in the training of 
professionals of all kinds, particularly the caring professions’ (p.1). Such a 
situation led Humphries to ask, and attempt to answer, the question of why the 
discourse of empowerment had become so dominant at this historical moment. 
She highlights the political struggles around class, feminism and anti-racism of 
the 1970s and 1980s and the rise and fall of bureaucratic and proceduralist 
strategies to combat inequality which differed from the more radical 
perspectives. The latter was more concerned with empowerment as being 
something that emerged through individual and collective action, the former 
involving a more top-down approach to the alleviation of individual and societal 
problems. Increasingly the more radical understanding of empowerment was 
appropriated within more mainstream political discourse and realigned with 
consumer culture and a more individualised notion of how to achieve 
empowerment.viii
     In similar vein, Langan (2002) points out that during the 1970s radical 
activists had a commitment to the “self-activity” of the working class. In such a 
climate of collective working class action the notion of philanthropy implied by 
the bestowal of power by professionals on the working class was not particularly 
resonant; the belief was that members of the working class were capable of 
organising themselves, of gaining power from below by virtue of their collective 
strength, not having it sprinkled onto them from above like confetti. In this 
respect, 
the rise of the concept of empowerment and its institutionalisation within 
social work theory and practice is reflective of both the decline of working 
class collective power and the changing conception of ‘empowerment’; 
from something to be taken, by force if necessary, to something to be 
handed down by the state.
(McLaughlin, forthcoming)
     Operating in a political climate in which ideology was seen as discredited and 
working class collective power was waning, the scope for critiques of structural 
oppression and collective political action was limited. These changes helped 
create a space for the terminology of empowerment to grow unencumbered by 
the baggage of “misguided” past political ideologies or practices. In other words, 
habitus itself was transformed.
Grounding the Habitus in psychological research
In this section we will discuss how the habitus concept can be useful for 
psychological explorations of social class. First, we want to demonstrate how the 
habitus concept is, to a great degree, founded psychologically (and is therefore 
very compatible with psychological research), and second, we intend to discuss 
how the habitus concept can enrich psychological research by addressing a 
number of blind spots of mainstream psychology.
      As alluded to above, Bourdieu is critical of the division of labour between 
sociology and psychology, and his work can be seen as an attempt to bridge the 
gap between these two disciplines. The habitus concept in particular aims to 
challenge the dichotomy between “inner” and “outer” or “individual” and 
“social”, but does so without damaging the analytical integrity of structure and 
agency (Maton, 2008). Bourdieu accepts that, for analytical purposes at least, 
structure and agency can be treated as separate entities, but encourages social 
research to relate the two terms to each other. Accordingly, it makes little sense 
to talk about the habitus in isolation, i.e. without talking about the relating social 
field at the same time. Doing so would “fetishize” (Maton, 2008, p. 61) the 
habitus and ultimately reduce it to a rather detached, superficial and ahistorical 
analysis of (class-specific) habits.
     This superficial and ahistorical tendency can be illustrated by the problematic 
way much psychological research deals with the problem of “work stress”. Often, 
the individual is ranked against pre-determined indicators of “stress”, and the 
higher the score the more stress they are said to be suffering (e.g. HSE, online). 
Such an approach is not only problematic from the point of view of psychiatric 
legitimacy, more importantly for our purposes, it merely engages with the 
present habitus to formulate a diagnosis. It fails to locate habitus historically 
within a changed social space in which the articulation of conflict and distress 
along class lines has changed markedly. 
     In the United Kingdom at least, whilst the working class may exist, it has to a 
large degree been marginalised. Numerous industrial defeats, perhaps most 
notably that of the 1984-85 miners’ strike, have influenced the way in which 
social space, in this particular case the workplace and industrial relations, are 
conceptualised. For example, the increasing failure, due to various factors, of 
collective working class action to win industrial disputes led to a change in 
tactics and role for trade unions. Today, there is likely to be less emphasis on the 
collective strength of the workforce and more focus on the individual weakness 
of the worker. Rather than be encouraged to take industrial action, for example 
by going on strike, the worker is more likely to be encouraged , often by their 
union representative, to take industrial inaction by going off sick due to suffering 
from "work stress" (Wainwright and Calnan, 2002). This is not to suggest that the 
worker is feigning illness, on the contrary, their subjective distress can be all too 
real. Rather, in Bourdeusian terms it is to provide an account of one way in which 
the outside gets inside.
     A useful way of conceptualising the emergence of the subject from his 
surroundings is that of the “triple helix self” by which Wainwright and Calnan 
seek to extend Marx’s (1852) observation that “Men make their own history, but 
they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances 
chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and 
transmuted from the past” (p.1). In the triple helix self, the three strands of the 
helix represent the natural environment, discourse and corporeality respectively.
Mind or subjectivity emerges from the helix as the three points spiral 
around each other across the life course. As well as illustrating the 
formation of the self at a particular point in time (the head of the helix), 
the model also reveals the biographical-historical dimensions of the self 
(the tail of the helix), as historically specific environmental conditions and 
discursive formations interact with corporeality across time. It is important 
to recognize that the tail of the helix predates the birth of the individual 
because corporeality (in the form of genetic material), and obviously 
discourse and the external environment, already exist (and already 
interact) before the emergence of the individual self.
 (Wainwright and Calnan, 2002, pp.85-86)
      In relation to workplace conflict the discursive and material changes lead to a 
changed habitus, with a corresponding influence on subjectivity (McLaughlin, 
2008). For example, as Wainwright and Calnan (2002) note, the concept of 
‘stress’ has influenced a change in both terminological and subjective 
understandings of workplace relations whereby traditional problems around 
oppressive management or exploitation are rearticulated within a health and 
safety framework, the former becoming ‘bullying’ or ‘harassment’, the latter 
‘excessive demands’ or ‘unreasonable pressure’.
     Using habitus as a descriptive rather than a relational term is in our opinion 
problematic for mainly three reasons. First, there is the danger that habitus is 
merely assumed or appropriated, simply overlaying data, instead of making the 
concept work in specific contexts (Reay, 2004). Habitus is not to be naturalised 
or essentialised but to be understood as existing in relation to specific fields and 
(power) structures.             
  
     Second, there is the related danger of putting an overly strong emphasis on 
the unconscious element of habitus and thereby ignoring its cognitive aspects. 
Doing so marginalises conscious agency and renders oppression virtually 
impossible to escape. Political resistance is turned into a solely therapeutic 
problem. Third, and again related to tendencies of naturalisation and 
essentialisation of habitus, there is the danger of a misuse of the habitus concept 
in the sense that systematically contradictory political and economic interests 
are reified as individual differences in terms of character or personality. Bourdieu 
has warned against the possibility of that specific misuse of his theory (Zander, 
2010) and pointed out that this interpretation could function as a misguided 
explanation for poverty and would effectively reverse the relation between 
habitus and power. Differences in habitus are the result of social inequalities not 
their cause.
     So, instead of an ahistorical and/or individual or indeed meso level analysis of 
the individual’s dispositions, Bourdieu suggests a relational mode of thinking that 
links visible empirical practice to underlying structural and structuring principles. 
Therefore, using the concept of habitus as a research tool necessarily 
encourages a rather broad focus that relates such things as individual behaviour 
and attitudes to social structures (Reay, 2004). To this we would add the need for 
a historically oriented approach. Hence, habitus can be seen as a connecting link 
between sociological and psychological questions. Bourdieu (1988, p. 782) sums 
up his ambition to counter the division of sociology and psychology thus: 
I believe that true scientific theory and practice must overcome this 
opposition by integrating into a single model the analysis of the 
experience of social agents and the analysis of the objective structures 
that make this experience possible.
(p.782). 
     With the habitus concept, Bourdieu offers a method to put this demand into 
practice. Applying the habitus as a research tool to the aforementioned domains 
of empowerment and work stress, can help to historically locate, recontextualise 
and critically further debates around these terms. This applies to the formulation 
of the respective problems and can also point towards potential solutions. 
Habitus as a method reintroduces the historical, social and political dimensions 
of empowerment and work stress. This is urgently needed as both concepts, as 
we have shown, nowadays tend to be negotiated on a predominantly individual 
level. Habitus as a theoretical concept and as a method can help to reconcile 
agency and structure. Habitus as a method can point to the relationship between 
individual and collective agency and more specifically to the already discussed 
interdependency of alleged individual responsibility and the lack of collective 
agency that are crucial with regards to both work stress and empowerment.
      Furthermore, the habitus concept brings into focus the political dimension 
and power structures of these areas. Habitus as a method can help to examine 
domination as everyday practice and to analyse how power is reproduced as well 
as resisted on an individual as well as on a collective level. Habitus is a method 
to analyse the dominance of dominant groups and the domination of subordinate 
groups (Reay, 1995).
      Finally, the historic dimensions and significance of the historicity of the 
discussed domains can be explored by utilising habitus. Habitus as a concept 
tries to address how the complex interplay between past and present translates 
into individual and collective consciousness (Bourdieu, 1977). 
     Of course, the actual difficulty lies in the practical application and 
operationalization of a concept as complex and, at times, elusive as the habitus. 
This is particularly true if one intends to follow Bourdieu’s demand not to 
essentialise habitus and to relate its specific contents to the related fields and 
wider social and political frameworks. 
      Given its complexity and psychoanalytical foundation, it might come as a 
surprise that Bourdieu uses habitus as a method in a rather conventional 
manner. He suggests to focus on the (interview-generated) narrative as, for him, 
the place of analysis has to be the actual, concrete narrative (Couldry, 2005). 
Conclusions regarding the habitus can be derived from those narratives. 
Bourdieu is very clear however, that this focus on individual narratives does not 
restrict social research to only exploring individualistic points of view. Quite the 
opposite, Bourdieu is of the opinion that individual narratives can express 
structural conditions: 
This explains the way that narratives about the most ‘personal’ difficulties, 
the apparently most subjective tensions and contradictions, frequently 
articulate the deepest structures of the social world and their 
contradictions.
 (Bourdieu & Ferguson, 1999, p. 511). 
      This is particularly true for people in precarious positions who develop an 
understanding of the objective contradictions that “have them in their grasp” 
(Bourdieu & Ferguson, 1999, p. 511) . So with regards to work stress, this means 
that narratives of (supposedly) individual suffering can point to wider historical 
developments and political and structural conditions like inequality, power 
struggles, exploitation and alienation.
      As shown above, the habitus concept draws on psychological ideas and we 
would argue that there are a number of reasons to support Zander's (2001) claim 
that habitus “cannot be founded convincingly without considering psychological 
contributions” (pp.1-2). Bourdieu clearly builds on the psychoanalytical idea of 
the unconscious. Social constraints are not usually evident to the individual. On 
the contrary, they tend to be perceived as normal and therefore not open to 
conscious analysis. Shared, but nevertheless class and gender specific 
“assumptions that 'go without saying’ determine the limits of the doable and the 
thinkable” (Maton, 2008, p. 59). Habitus can consequently not be seen as a 
concept solely referring to conscious, intellectual aspects of human existence. 
Habitus should rather be understood as “embodied”, as a way of acting as well 
as thinking and feeling. Hence, habitus informs practice not in a predominantly 
cognitive, rational and straightforward fashion, but as implicit knowledge of what 
is appropriate, or as Bourdieu himself puts it, as a “feel for the game” (Bourdieu, 
1990, p. 61) or the aforementioned ‘sense of one's place’. Often, this ‘sense of 
one’s place’ can be reinforced through processes that are ostensibly about 
challenging the subordinated social status of social, mostly working class, actors.
      Processes of internalisation are of central relevance for the habitus concept. 
Bourdieu argues that social and economic constraints enter the individual's 
consciousness in the shape of such things as rules, constraints, taste and 
conflict. These are related to the individual's position in the social hierarchy, and 
as alluded to above, positions in social space cause relatively stable dispositions 
in the individual. This nexus is not to be interpreted as a mechanistic and 
straightforward process, but as a complex and emotionally charged interplay. 
Bourdieu puts a strong emphasis on the practical character of classed existence 
and points out that dispositions can be derived from practice without entering 
discourse or consciousness (Zander, 2010). This unconscious element in the 
reproduction of power is played out on an individual as well as on a collective 
level and is reflected in the duality of the habitus concept.  As we have alluded to 
above, the hierarchical order of the social informs attitudes, behaviours and 
emotions in a very practical and not necessary conscious and cognitive way. 
Skeggs (1997) exemplifies how implicit knowledge about one’s place in the social 
hierarchy unconsciously informs a person’s sense of belonging and affinity,  and 
more specifically how participants in her study (working-class girls) felt out of 
place in a high-priced department store due to feeling a sense of unease in a 
setting they felt they did not have a right to be in. This sense of feeling out of 
place is aggravated by the lack of a positively loaded female working class 
position in the UK context. 
Conclusion
Bourdieu speaks of “socio-analysis” by which he is referring to the strong 
collective element in the historically formed unconscious (Bourdieu & Ferguson, 
1999, p. 628). Analogous to psychoanalysis, he sees a potentially therapeutic 
function in the process of self-analysis.  By bringing one's place in the social 
world and the social conditions that shape the  social hierarchy into 
consciousness, they are no longer perceived as the natural order of things but 
are opened up to critique.
     
     These are themes psychological research can clearly relate to and explore 
further. With the habitus concept, Bourdieu discusses areas like taste, aspiration 
and the formation of gender and class-specific experiences that are certainly of 
interest to psychologically informed research. What makes the habitus concept 
so valuable is the thematisation of the inextricable connection of the individual 
and the social dimension of these matters. As El-Mafaalani and Wirtz (2011) 
argue, from a methodological point of view habitus is very compatible with 
psychological research as it aims to objectively explore the positions of the 
individual in the social world. Bourdieu tries to formulate systematic functional 
contexts on the basis of descriptions of individual experiences and action. 
Furthermore, habitus, applied in a Bourdieusian sense, always incorporates 
political aspects and relates supposedly neutral or apolitical circumstances and 
developments to processes of power. 
     
     This however happens on a very fundamental level and it might therefore be 
somewhat short-sighted to state that habitus is helpful to uncover 
distinguishable aspects of power in social interactions and conditions (McNay, 
2008). However, with regards to subject formation, power in a Bourdieusian 
sense is not one aspect among many others, but constitutive of the whole 
process. The same goes for the involved psychological dynamics; power 
structures are not only reinforced by psychological dynamics but shape them on 
a very fundamental level. Habitus as a concept therefore can counter discourses 
that “depoliticise oppression” (McNay, 2008, p. 10) and help to put oppression 
back on the map and to re-politicise it.
     
     In similar vein, the habitus concept can, in our opinion, contribute to uncover 
and to critically discuss possible blind spots of psychological research.  Exploring 
“blind spots” in contemporary mainstream psychology with regards to social 
class is from our point of view best approached by discussing underlying, often 
implicit, ideological assumptions that inform mainstream psychological research 
and that push the aforementioned attempts to utilise habitus as a research tool 
to the fringes of the discipline. In other words, we would argue that much 
mainstream psychology tends to avoid dealing with classed inequalities as social 
class as a concept stands in conflict with an individualised understanding of 
human nature. Due to a preoccupation with (supposedly) individualistic 
motivations for behaviour, collective and social aspects take a back seat. Parker 
(2007, p. 33) argues that “there are always intriguing blind spots where some 
features [of human nature] are taken for granted” and that therefore psychology 
“remains trapped within its own horizon”. The difficulties of mainstream 
psychology to relate to structural inequalities are, according to Parker (2007), 
expressed in the assumption of a statistical normal distribution, the bell curve, 
that orders people along pre-set dimensions and defines normality and 
abnormality as percentages, as statistical variations.
     Rose (1996), in a similar vein, argues that the individualised understanding of 
human existence is ideologically founded and also ideological in its effects as 
‘the self’ functions according to Rose (1996, p. 127) as a “regulatory idea”. In 
this world view social issues are reframed as individual responsibilities. Again the 
political nature of empowerment comes to the fore and is reflected in the 
language of political discourse when unemployed people are referred to as 
(supposedly empowered) ‘job seekers’ and homeless people turned into ‘rough 
sleepers’ (Rose 1996). Social problems are translated into individual challenges 
and comprehended as solvable by self-betterment. Rose (1999) demonstrates 
how this ideology empowers psychology as a discipline and vastly increases its 
scope and influence. According to this critique, mainstream psychology is 
affirmative in its effects as it reproduces the image of the autonomous, morally 
responsible citizen and uses techniques that make this citizen interested in their 
own government.  Structural inequalities, which are at the core of the habitus 
concept, are therefore difficult to reconcile with a world view that appears to 
inform mainstream psychology, not least because they would to some degree 
curtail or call into questions the remit of the discipline. 
     Nevertheless, as we have shown, there are no principle incompatibilities that 
would make the interpretation and utilisation of habitus in psychological research 
per se problematic. On the contrary,  the application of the habitus concept in 
psychological research contexts could help to explore how objective (power) 
structures enter subjectivity. Internalisation and embodiment cannot just be 
assumed or taken for granted, but have to be critically discussed with regards to 
tensions, contradictions and possibilities for resistance. Accordingly, 
psychological (and psychoanalytical) insights can help to explore the processes 
that  lead to the reproduction of power . Habitus is a notoriously vague and 
elusive concept and given the amount of work it has to do in Bourdieu's theory 
this is not a surprise. It is however very possible to apply the habitus concept to 
the real world and to use it as a formidable tool to grasp the complexity of the 
social world. Due to its foundations in psychological theory, habitus as method is 
very compatible with psychological explorations of social class. 
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i This critique is political in nature not in the sense that it necessarily produces political 
demands, but political in a sense that it problematizes structural inequalities and their 
repercussions.
 
ii Several Marxist thinkers have developed the analysis of the relation between the 
economic and the symbolic order. For example, see Friedman (2009) for an evaluation 
of the links between Gramsci's conception of hegemony and Bourdieu's concept of 
habitus. 
 
iii Bourdieu was not the first to refer to habitus, Thomas Aquinas used the term in the 
thirteenth century to refer to the stable dispositions that people acquire throughout 
their lives (Kerr, 2009).
iv As mentioned, these studies were set in the UK and therefore the findings are to 
some degree specific to contemporary social, cultural and political circumstances in 
the UK. Class conflict in other historical and geographical contexts will have produced 
different understandings of social order and one's place in it. 
v The decline of class consciousness is a result of myriad factors. There were significant 
working class defeats during the 1980s, the defeat of the year long miners’ strike of 1984-85 
being the most high-profile example). A variety of anti-trade union legislation was also 
introduced which severely curtailed the use of spontaneous industrial action, limited the 
number of pickets and banned secondary picketing (although from a more radical perspective 
the demand would have been for action irrespective of state approval). In addition, the rise and 
institutionalisation of identity politics helped to sideline class as the main vehicle through which 
to locate the self and achieve social change.
vi We use the term ‘shrinking social space’ to refer to the process whereby social and 
political issues are frequently reduced to interpersonal psychological issues 
disconnected from any wider socio-political analysis.
vii This is not to imply that such a process is not resisted. Indeed, there have been 
many instances of both individual and collective struggle against the power of the psy-
disciplines (e.g. see Crossley, 2006).
viii For an example of this in relation post-feminism, ‘girl-power’ and consumer culture 
see McRobbie (2009).
